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Clandestine Services Review

Number 34

25X1A9A

Questions for [REDACTED] 27 September 1961

1. Do you know and can you tell us who the new Director will be and when will he take over?
2. Many of the lecturers have stated that the intelligence community is undergoing a reorganization. In your opinion will this reorganization affect CIA organization?
3. What arrangements have or are being made between the Agency and the newly created DIA to ensure that there will be a minimum of duplication in clandestine intelligence activities?
4. Has any thought been given to the possibility of using selected personnel from the military services who are assigned to the DIA to work under the operational control and guidance of the Agency against military, air, and naval targets of foreign countries?
5. In view of the large number of Foreign Service Officers who appear to be ignorant of the true role and mission of the Agency, would it not be possible to establish a procedure whereby appropriate Agency personnel could be used to brief newly commissioned Foreign Service Officers while undergoing training at FSI? Could arrangements also be made to ensure that present middle-grade and upper-grade Foreign Service Officers receive this same type briefing when next in Washington?
6. What is the Agency's position on the division of paramilitary activities between the Department of Defense and CIA? At what general level of size will

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the Agency pass or relinquish such operations as currently conducted under the title of "Peacetime Covert Activities" to the military?


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7. What is being done on the policy level to assign to different U. S. Government agencies their specific responsibilities in rendering internal security assistance to foreign governments?
 8. In your opinion how are the present working relationships between top-level personnel in CIA and NSA?
 9. A new regulation [REDACTED] is designed to attack a major unresolved problem. How many personnel, and when, in the Clandestine Services will be effected? What will be the attitude toward "readjustment assistance" in cases where there is no civilian counterpart of a CS job? Does the [REDACTED] "procedure" amount to involuntary separation so that 25 years service will provide immediate retirement benefits under civil service? 25X1A
 10. What is DDP policy toward GS-13's and above who wish to transfer to the DDP from other elements of the Agency?
 11. Despite all that is on paper about career planning for career service members of the Agency, one hears much from many returnees on their mishandling; their misplacement; and in several instances just plain lack of interest in the returnee. Actually what does the future hold for the 10-year-plus veteran? What are the long-range plans to develop a cadre of professional intelligence operators?
 - 25X1A9a 12. [REDACTED] suggested that a new approach to personnel management is being made within DD/P. Has a new policy been developed? If so, would you describe it?

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13. What is DDP's thinking on personnel management and policies as they relate to long-range career planning?
14. The published story on your comprehensive report on "Communist Forgeries" to a U. S. Senate Sub-Committee reflects a polite but somewhat mild interest on the part of the committee members. Would you comment on whether their interest was greater than the printed report indicates, whether the report received significant publicity either here or abroad, and whether the Agency has launched any counter-attacks?
15. Can freedom survive with a free press revealing information damaging to the United States?
16. Will consideration be given to the use of President Kennedy's UN speech in an active propaganda campaign?
17. We have heard from a previous speaker the secrecy with which CA matters taken up by the Special Group are treated. I have heard, however, that coordination of "5412" matters that takes place on lower levels (between CIA and medium-level officials of the Department of State, for example) often leads to wider discussion of these matters in State than is desirable. Do you feel this is true? If so, have you any suggestions that we might follow to improve this aspect of security of CA operations?
18. What was the real value, the final take, of the U-2? Did it provide a wealth of hitherto unobtainable intelligence information? Was it worth the money?
19. During this course the speakers have consistently said "No use going over Cuba-- you all know about that." Being overseas, all we really know is what the newspapers said, surely biased, and the DCI's reassuring cable, "We'll come out all

right." Please give us something a bit more concrete. After all, this is our Agency too!

20. What is the future role of CIA in view of such late developments, as Cuba and the State Department's attitudes regarding CS operations?
21. To what extent can we operate at the U. N. ? What are we doing there in the CA area? Are we making any recruitments? Are there any problems with State?
22. Could you, within security considerations, tell us what DPD is doing, and how its plans and activities are coordinated with the Divisions and Branches?
23. Does the Agency have a system for reviewing sensitive, high-risk projects compromise of which at a particular time would have an impact on the U. S. policy-making level?
24. To what extent does the DDP seek to prevent future flaps by determining the reasons and responsibilities for past failures?
25. Does the Clandestine Services recognize that there may be certain extraordinary operational situations in which such techniques as the use of drugs, abduction, or assassination might further our mission and, if so, are we prepared or permitted to use such techniques?
26. 
27. What is the relative amount of time and attention devoted to the three fields of clandestine effort--FI, CI, and CA? Is the degree of emphasis left largely

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 station and the case officer's particular political
 situation and case officer talent warrants, or does it reflect some amount of
 long-range headquarters planning?


28. Realizing that the RMD spells out priorities and that the natural tendency on the part of the stations is to concentrate on easy and accessible targets within the same priority, would you please comment on how Headquarters sees to it that proper emphasis is given to difficult targets in terms of overall effort of that station?
29. Will early warning come from ELINT sources or agent assets in the event of the start of a hot war?
30. What is the most fruitful method of collecting intelligence on the USSR--legal travellers, agents within the USSR, within the bloc, ELINT, COMINT?
31. To what specific factors can the Agency's lack of unilateral Agent assets within the Soviet Union be attributed? Why does the agency depend upon third-party liaison material rather than establish its own assets?

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 32.

33.

was Agency planning in order to be in position to begin operations? What action was taken in advance of independence to insure Agency presence?

34. Should there be more cross-pollination between the DDP and the DDI components? If so, in terms of career at what stage?

35. The intensified drive for clandestine collection of scientific intelligence has resulted in a closer than normal relationship between DDI and DDP elements. Do you feel other collection efforts might benefit from closer coordination between those components?
36. Please comment on the feasibility of administering the clandestine services separately from the DDI and DDS components as a means of freeing the DDP of adherence to CSC-type regulations. Would not such a separation allow for more latitude in personnel and fiscal policies, and perhaps contribute to esprit de corps?
37. 
38. Would you please comment on current and future planning for greater use of non-official cover? What is wrong with the system as it now stands and what is being done to improve it?
39. Is there a definite trend within DDP for operating on a more selective basis under non-official cover assignments? If so, is the trend based on desire or circumstances?
40. What is the Agency's position regarding the use of non-official cover, particularly in areas such as Europe, where official cover has been used extensively?
41. Although it is realized that each non-official cover situation poses its unique problems, can you comment generally on how operational direction, operational support, communications, and logistics support will be handled?